The Variation of Classical Greek Wishes

A Functional Discourse Grammar and Common Ground approach

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Abstract: This paper examines several unobserved variations of realizable Classical Greek wishes which radically change our conception of them. Using the layered approach to clause structure from Functional Discourse Grammar, I demonstrate that the wish optative has both a semantic and a pragmatic illocutionary value. Semantically, the wish optative, in Classical Greek, is non-subjective epistemic (instead of the previously proposed deontic) as witnessed by its contextual communicative value and its (infrequent) combinations with the subjective particles ἄρα and ἦ.

Realizable wishes have their own specific illocutionary value and sincerity condition. They express the speaker’s psychological commitment to a realizable state of affairs for several contextual reasons. I argue that εἴθε and εἰ γάρ, which, contrary to common opinion, are highly infrequent with wish optatives, are contextually motivated illocutionary particles. The particles occur when the speaker’s current psychological commitment has not been sufficiently established in the interlocutor(s)’ Common Ground, which contains “the sum of [interlocutors’] mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions” (Clark 1996: 96). The particle νυν combined with the wish optative, a combination which was overlooked in analyses of νυν, marks the Discourse Act of the wish illocution as consequential from the previous acts in the Common Ground.


1. Introducing the variation

There is a great deal of unexplored variation to realizable Classical Greek wishes, with the so-called wish optative, which has not been
acknowledged thus far. Most importantly, they can occur with more particles than has been noticed before. The variation with regards to particles, in my opinion, has remained unobserved due to the influence of the paramount work on particles by Denniston 1954. Even though Denniston, with what is called a maximalist approach, aimed to meticulously describe particle usages, he did not systematically distinguish between particle usages with specific mood uses. Consequently, the later scholars did not distinguish between particle usages with specific moods either. The combinations of particles with wish optatives in table 1 may therefore strike readers as surprising. The lack of comments on these combinations from later scholars also becomes more understandable when we notice Denniston’s silence on the im/possibility of the wish optative with all the following particles: ἄρα, νυν, ἦ, δῆτα, αὐτάρ, ἀτάρ, δῆθεν, (δῆ)που, δήπουθεν, καί, μέντοι, οὖν, οὐκοῦν, κατίοι and τοίνυν.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wish optative type</th>
<th>Aristophanes</th>
<th>Euripides</th>
<th>Plato</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ εἴθε</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ εἴ γάρ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ γέ</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ ἄρα</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ νυν</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ δῆτα</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ ἦ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 For a good introduction to different levels of linguistic variation, both synchronic (as here) and diachronic, see Bentein, Janse and Soltic 2017: 1–8. This paper limits itself to wish optatives in Classical Greek. For the wish optative in dialects, see Slotty 1915.

3 For a list of main clause mood uses, see Rijksbaron 2006: 6–8 or more exhaustively Revuelta Puigdollers 2005.

4 For example, in the volume by Rijksbaron 1997 or Loggozzo and Poccetti 2018 there are no discussions of the interaction of these domains. Denizot 2011: 82–86 shortly discusses particles which are susceptible to occur with directives, but does not perform an in-depth assessment of their influence on the meaning of the co-occurring mood. Exceptions are Revuelta Puigdollers 2017 and Tronci 2017 who investigate the distribution of particles across sentence types and Allan 2009 and 2013b on the relevance of particles to distinguish different text types and modes of narration.

5 This combination is not mentioned by Allan 2018 and Revuelta Puigdollers 2017: 25.

6 The particle δῆτα occurs in declarative, interrogative and optative sentences, pace Revuelta Puigdollers 2017: 25 who says that it only occurs in interrogative sentences.
However, two recent theoretical improvements in understanding the relationship between particles and mood/modality urge us to take the variation in particle combination seriously (see also La Ro i 2019). Thijs 2017 recently argued convincingly that μήν in non-assertive speech acts (e.g. questions) has a different value than in assertive speech acts (e.g. statements). Furthermore, Revuelta Puigdollers 2017: 24 summarized the compatibility of particles with certain sentence types, arguing that particles “mark or modify both the illocutionary force and the modality expressed by the clause”. In the current paper I will go one step further and argue that several particles provide essential clues as to how realizable wishes are composed both semantically and pragmatically. Put more technically, I will propose a layered approach to wishes inspired by Functional Discourse Grammar9 (henceforth FDG), a theoretical approach which has proven valuable to the classification of particles but, in my view, can also be fruitfully applied to mood/modality and their combinations with particles.10 More specifically, I will argue that the wish optative has a non-subjective epistemic semantics in contrast to the deontic semantics attributed to it in previous studies (Crespo 1992: 282, Crespo et al. 2003: 293–297 and Allan 2013: 31).11 Deontic modality evaluates the moral acceptability or necessity of a state of affairs involving notions such as “allowance”, “permission” and “obligation” (Nuyts 2001: 25).

| + δή | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| + μήν | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| wish optatives8 | 119 | 248 | - | 367 |

Table 1 Variation of the wish optative with particles

7 The only three (!) examples ever given in the literature are from Homer and presented with doubt by Denniston 1954: 331–332. I believe that it is unwarranted to assume that μήν occurs in wishes in Classical Greek, pace Allan 2015 and Thijs 2017: 79 who say that it occurs in wishes but offer no examples. After all, I found no examples in Aristophanes, Euripides or Plato.

8 To collect the attestations, I consulted Perseus Under Philologic (PuPh) searching for all optatives in Aristophanes and Euripides. I went through all the occurrences and counted by hand how many times the (sometimes alleged) optatives were actually wish optatives. Since we cannot be fully certain that PuPh listed all wish optatives and since PuPh occasionally also listed indicatives or nouns, I suggest that there are at least 372 wish optatives in Aristophanes and Euripides.

9 Please note that Revuelta Puigdollers 2005 has already presented an insightful classification of mood and mood using concepts from Functional Grammar, the precursor of Functional Discourse Grammar, and speech act theory.

10 See Allan 2015 and 2017 who used FDG to classify the Ancient Greek particles and describe their diachronic change.

11 Note, however, that Allan 2013: 41–42 does suggest that wishes may have important epistemic implications which distinguish them from other moods.
Epistemic modality evaluates the likelihood of a state of affairs being the case. To substantiate this proposal, I will examine the infrequent combinations with the particles ἄρα and ἦ which express subjective semantic meanings. Also, rather than likening realizable wishes to imperatives as a weaker form of directive (Crespo 1992, Crespo, Conti and Maquieira 2003 and Denizot 2011: 445–455), I will argue that realizable wishes have their own illocutionary value, i.e. intended communicative value, distinct from directives. I will demonstrate that the combinations with the particles εἴθε, εἰ γάρ and νυν, which express pragmatic meanings, are especially informative of the usage value of realizable wish optatives.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces FDG’s layered approach to clause structure. Section 3 presents a semantic analysis of the combinations with the subjective semantic particles ἄρα and ἦ. Section 4 presents relevant new theoretical background on illocution. Subsequently, I analyse the illocutionary values of realizable wishes by examining to which communicative ends they are used in context. Finally, I analyse the combinations with εἴθε, εἰ γάρ and νυν, pointing out different types of contextual conditions of use (sincerity condition and Common Ground usage conditions).

2. A layered approach with Functional Discourse Grammar

FDG is a typologically based theory of language structure. FDG maintains that the grammar of a language expresses meaning that pertains to several different levels. Here only the representational and the interpersonal levels will be considered. These two levels correspond with the semantic (representational level) and pragmatic (interpersonal level) meaning that the grammar of any language can express. Each level consists of multiple layers that are hierarchically organized in the same way as the layers of an onion are organized from outer to inner layers. Each layer has an inventory of operators and modifiers, the former referring to grammatical expressions and the latter to lexical expressions of the layer in question. These express the semantic and pragmatic relationships assigned to their layer. When modifiers and/or operators from different layers occur in clauses, they

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12 Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008 naturally provide a more extensive treatment than the present one since I will focus on the levels and layers relevant for the analysis of the wish optative and the particles that accompany it. For a more exhaustive application to Ancient Greek particles, see Allan 2015 and 2017.

13 Please note that pragmatic will not be used to cover non-coded interpersonal meanings, as it sometimes is in speech act oriented literature.
scope over each other. Modifiers and operators of the outer layer thereby either pragmatically or semantically assign meaning to inner layers of the clause due to their hierarchical relationships. Whether they assign pragmatic or semantic meaning depends on whether they belong to a layer on the interpersonal (pragmatic) or the representational (semantic) level. Thus, the complete semantic and pragmatic specificities of a clause can be deduced from how either modifiers or operators are hierarchically organized in that clause and from the clause’s context.

To not overcomplicate matters, I will only mention the layers here that will be relevant to the ensuing analysis. The highest hierarchical layers of the semantic and pragmatic level are the following.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representational level</th>
<th>Interpersonal level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propositional content</td>
<td>Move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode</td>
<td>Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of affairs</td>
<td>Illocution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(...)</td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 the hierarchical organisation in FDG

The following example demonstrates these notions put into practice.

(1) **Certainly**, he may have forgotten.

This whole sentence is a Discourse Act with a declarative illocution, meaning that the communicative function of the clause is to inform the addressee of a proposition. In FDG, illocution is defined as “the lexical and formal properties of that Discourse Act that can be attributed to its conventionalized interpersonal use in achieving an intention” (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 68). “Certainly” expresses the speaker’s subjective commitment to the state of affairs “he may have forgotten”. In FDG terms, “certainly” specifies the semantic layer of propositional content of this illocution. The propositional content layer 1) “consists of mental constructs that do not exist in space or time but rather exist in the minds of those entertaining them” and 2) “can be qualified in terms of propositional attitudes (certainty, doubt, disbelief) and/or in terms of their source or origin (shared common knowledge, sensory evidence, inference)” (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 144). In Ancient Greek, the subjective epistemic
particle ἦ and inferential/mirative ἄρα belong to this layer (see Allan 2015 and la Roi 2019).\footnote{For ἦ, see Cuypers 2005: 50 and Denniston 1954: 279–288. This view of ἦ diverges slightly from the one presented by Sicking and Van Ophuijsen 1993 and Wakker 1997: 213 who define the particle in opposition to μὴν. For μὴν, I rather agree with Thijs 2017.}

“May” is a non-subjective\footnote{Non-subjective epistemic modalities such as “may” have also been called “objective” following Lyons 1977: 797–804, but I prefer the term non-subjective to stipulate the difference with subjective epistemic modality and avoid the suggestion that language can ever be truly objective.} epistemic modality, a type of epistemic modality that is acknowledged in several functional theories of language.\footnote{E.g. Functional Grammar, Functional Discourse Grammar and Systemic-Functional grammar, see Butler 2003. Please note that I will refrain from getting trapped in the theory-specific debate on the exact hierarchical positioning of non-subjective epistemic modalities below the propositional content layer. For a good typologically informed discussion of this topic, I refer the reader to Narrog 2009.} Epistemic modality is best defined as concerning “an indication of the estimation, typically, but not necessarily, by the speaker, of the chances that the state of affairs expressed in the clause applies in the world” (Nuyts 2006: 6, my italics).\footnote{For the problematic association of subjectivity and epistemic modality, see especially Narrog 2012: 8–45. For an application to Classical Greek see la Roi 2019: 61–67. Epistemic modality has been defined in subjective terms only by, for example, Bybee, Pagliuca and Perkins 1994 and those who followed them, e.g. Allan 2013 for Ancient Greek.} When a non-subjective modality such as “may” is combined with subjective markers from the higher propositional content layer as in example 1, the combination is non-harmonic, because they do not share the same modal strength (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 174 and Lyons 1977: 807).\footnote{Please note that the notions of harmonic and non-harmonic have been wrongly applied to Ancient Greek (esp. to the potential optative and future indicative) on several occasions, as discussed in la Roi 2019: 62–67.} As a result, the subjective marker (“certainly”) scopes over the non-subjective marker and specifies the speaker’s judgment with regard to a given possibility (“may have forgotten”). By contrast, when a subjective epistemic modality marker is combined with another subjective marker from the same propositional content layer, both strengthen each other. An example from Classical Greek is subjective epistemic κινδυνεύω with inferential ἄρα, Pl. Euthphr. 11d. Such harmonic combinations are naturally more frequent than non-harmonic ones as the one from example 1. For example, harmonic combinations of a subjective future with the subjective particles ἦ and ἄρα are about 10 times as frequent as with the non-subjective epistemic potential optative (la Roi 2019: 70–71).
3. Semantic values of realizable wishes

In this section I argue that the wish optative is semantically non-subjective epistemic. My arguments for this analysis are the following: (1) The communicative force of realizable wishes shows that they express a state of affairs which is already assumed by the interlocutors to be realizable (rather than an evaluation of the (moral) necessity of it (=deontic) or subjectively claimed by the speaker to be the case (=subjective epistemic)); (2) the subjective particles from the propositional content layer, mirative/inferential ἄρα and subjective epistemic ἦ, modify (i.e. scope over) the non-subjective epistemic value of the wish optative when combined as a non-harmonic combination. The fact that the non-harmonic combinations of the wish optative with ἄρα and ἦ are infrequent is due to the non-subjective epistemic semantics of the wish optative.

In the following example, Lysistrata makes the women take an oath to initiate the famous sex strike to stop the Peloponnesian war.

(2) Calonice εἰ δὲ παραβαίην, ὕδατος ἐμπλῇθ ἡ κύλιξ.
Lysistrata συνεπόμνυθ᾽ ὑμεῖς ταῦτα πᾶσαι;
All νὴ Δία. (Ar. Lys. 236–237)
Calonice But if I break them, may the cup be full of water.
Lysistrate So swear you one and all?
All So swear we all! (transl. Henderson)

Genuinely wishing that the big cup of wine will instead contain only water presupposes that the wish is known to be realizable. There would be no point, otherwise, in using the wish to show one’s allegiance to a cause. Thus, the communicative value of the wish in context already suggests that the wish optative ἐμπλῇθ refers to a state of affairs which is known to be realizable to the addressees, a non-subjective epistemic possibility. The wish does not mean that Calonice subjectively supposes that it is, i.e. I wish (realizable wish illocution) that the cup is certainly full (subjective epistemic modality) or that there is a moral necessity to it being full (deontic modality).

19 Revuelta Puigdollers 2005 classified the wish optative as semantically epistemic, but did not offer any evidence or discussion of this classification. See la Roi 2019 for an elaborate argument for the non-subjective epistemic value of the Classical Greek potential optative. For additional evidence that wishes are an epistemic modality, see Palmer 2001: 134 and Chondrogianni 2010 on Modern Greek wishes.
20 I made use of the most recent Loeb translations by Kovacs 1994–2003 and Henderson 1998–2007, which I sometimes had to adapt in order to translate the nuances of the particles in combination with wishes more precisely.
Also in the following example, the wish optative, now used for (conventionalized) best wishes to Helen, presupposes that it is a realizable possibility that the gods repay Helen. In other words, the point of Teucer’s realizable wish is to show Helen his support. The wish does not subjectively suppose that the gods repay Helen (=subjective epistemic) or that a (moral) necessity urges the gods to repay Helen (=deontic).

(3) Helen πλοῦς, ὦ ξέν', αὐτὸς σημανεῖ· σὺ δ' ἐκλιπὼν γῆν τήνδε φεῦγε, πρὶν σε παῖδα Πρωτέως ἱδεῖν, ὃς ἄρχει τῇ ἀγάλμασιν ἄπεστι δὲ κυσὶν πεποιθὼς ἐν φοναῖς θηροκτόνως κτείνει γὰρ Ἕλλην' ὁν' ἂν λάβηι ξένον. ὅτου δ' ἐκατε μήτε σῳ ἔνδοτον μαθεῖν ἐγὼ τε σιγῶ· τί γὰρ ὠφελοῖμι σε; Teucer καλῶς ἔλεξας, ὦ γύναι· θεοὶ δέ σοι ἀντιδωρησάτο (E. Hel. 151–159)

Helen The journeying itself will show you the way, stranger. But leave this land quickly before Proteus’ son, the country’s ruler, sees you! He is away hunting wild beasts with his hounds, but he kills every Greek he catches. Just why, you should not try to learn, and I will not tell you. What good would it do to you?

Teucer Thanks for your good advice, lady. And may the gods repay you for your kindness! (transl. Kovacs)

Wishes with ἄρα

In the next examples we find combinations of the wish optative with ἄρα. Classical Greek ἄρα has two semantically close components, an evidential and a mirative one, of which either one may be present or both at the same time (Allan 2015: 9). On the one hand, the particle can express inferential evidentiality, meaning that the speaker’s source of information for a statement is inference. This means that the validity of the statement relies on the speaker’s subjective deduction from perceptible evidence, earlier experiences or (logical) reasoning. On the other hand, ἄρα can signify the speaker’s subjective surprise at the new or remarkable information which s/he has been presented with. A connection between the two values lies in the orientation of the subjective judgment, because surprise about something is often expressed in hindsight, which is also a fundamental feature of inferential evidentiality. Furthermore, the surprise value can be a side-effect of the context, as we will see in example 5 below. It is therefore not always easy to determine whether an example contains only one of the semantic components or both.
The speaker-oriented nature of both values make that the particle ἄρα, according to Allan, should be placed as an operator of the Propositional Content layer at the Representational level, i.e. as a subjective semantic particle.\footnote{With Allan, I disagree with Wakker 1997 that the particle should be seen as interactional.} Besides semantic grounds, I believe that there is a formal argument that supports this classification: the particle scopes under interrogative illocutions (as does ἦ).\footnote{Allan 2015.}

As with subjective ἦ, the scope relations of this question can be paraphrased as I ask (interrogative illocution) whether \textit{therefore} (ἄρ') is the case that, if I went there now, I would not get (λάβοιμι) anything either. “I ask” represents the interrogative illocution, whereas “it therefore is the case” represents the subjective supposition contained in the question. “Therefore” here signifies the subjective inference which the particle expresses and scopes over the epistemic value of the potential optative (“I would get”).\footnote{For more tests that point to a non-subjective value of the potential optative, see la Roi 2019: 71–84.} As we will see later on, a similar hierarchical paraphrase is possible for ἄρα with the wish optative in a realizable wish illocution.

In example 5 from Euripides’ Cyclops we find inferential ἄρα with a potential mirative side-effect.\footnote{The examples of ἄρα with a wish optative are: Ar. Ec. 977, Lys. 933, Th. 887, E. Cyc. 261, Hipp. 1028 and Heracl. 651.} Odysseus has told Polyphemus a lie in order to refute Silenus’ story that Odysseus and his men have stolen Polyphemus’ food. Naturally, the blatant lying behaviour by Odysseus surprises Silenus (cf. ἐγώ: What, me?). He therefore wishes that Silenus may be damned for making such a suggestion. Note that the

\begin{quote}
Chremes πλεῖστος ἀνθρώπων ὄχλος, δόσος συμπεπάτοτ' ἦ,θ' ἄθροις ἐς τήν πύκνα. καὶ ὅτι πάντας σκοτοτόμους ἰδέις ἔχομεν ὀργάντες αὐτούς· ύπαρ ἄλλ' ὑπερφυώς ὡς λευκοπληθής ἦν ἡ ἐκκλησία. ὡστ' οὖκ ἔλαβον οὔτ' αὐτὸς οὔτ' ἄλλοι συχνοί. Blepyrus οὔτ' ἄρ' ἄριστον ἔγώ λάβομι νῦν ἐλθὼν; (Ar. Ἐκ. 383–389)

Chremes A huge crowd of people showed up en masse at the Pnyx, an all-time record. And you know, we thought they all looked like shoemakers; really, the Assembly was awfully pale faced to behold. So I didn’t get anything, and a bunch of others didn’t either.

Blepyrus So if I went there now I \textbf{therefore wouldn’t get} anything either? (transl. Henderson, slightly adapted)
\end{quote}

(4) Chremes πλεῖστος ἀνθρώπων ὄχλος, δόσος συμπεπάτοτ' ἦ,θ' ἄθροις ἐς τήν πύκνα. καὶ ὅτι πάντας σκοτοτόμους ἰδέις ἔχομεν ὀργάντες αὐτούς· ύπαρ ἄλλ' ὑπερφυώς ὡς λευκοπληθής ἦν ἡ ἐκκλησία. ὡστ' οὖκ ἔλαβον οὔτ' αὐτὸς οὔτ' ἄλλοι συχνοί. Blepyrus οὔτ' ἄρ' ἄριστον ἔγώ λάβομι νῦν ἐλθὼν; (Ar. Ἐκ. 383–389)
translation by Henderson captures the figurative force of the death wish well, since Silenus’ death wish damns Odysseus rather than sincerely wishes him dead.

(5) Odysseus τοὺς δ’ ἄρνας ἡ μῖν οὖτος ἀντ’ οἴνου σκύφου ἀπημπόλα τε κἀδίδου πιεῖν λαβὼ νέκων ἐκούσι, κούδέν ἦν τούτων βίαι. ἀλλ’ οὔτος ύπέξες οὔδέν ὄν φησιν λέγει, ἐπεὶ κατελήφθη σοι λάθραι πολλόν τά σά. Silenus ἐγώ; κακῶς γ’ ἄρ’ ἔξολοι’. (E. Cyc. 256–261)

Odysseus And this fellow, since he had got something to drink, sold and tendered us these sheep for a cup of wine, willing seller to willing buyers: there was no violence in this business. But now every word this fellow says is a lie since he has been caught selling your goods behind your back.

Silenus What, me? Damnation take you! (transl. Kovacs)

The full value of the wish can, in a compensatory fashion, be hierarchically paraphrased as: I wish (realizable wish illocution) that therefore (ἄρ’) you would die/be damned (ἐξόλοι’).

In the next example ἄρα only expresses the speaker’s subjective inference without a side-effect of mirativity. In his attempts to persuade his wife Myrrhine to have sex with him despite the current sex strike, Cinesias has promised to do his utmost best for a peace settlement for the Peloponnesian war.

(6) Myrrhine ἤδη πάντ’ ἔχω;
Cinesias ἀπαντα δήτα. δεῦρό νυν, ὦ χρυσίον. Myrrhine τὸ στρόφιον ἤδη λύομαι. μέμνησό νυν· μή μ’ ἐξαπατήσῃς τὰ περὶ τῶν διαλλαγῶν.
Cinesias νὴ Δί’ ἀπολοίμην ἄρα. (Ar. Lys. 929–933)
Myrrhine There, is that everything?
Cinesias Everything for sure. Now come here, my little treasure! Myrrhine I’m just getting my breast band off. But remember: don’t break your promise about a peace settlement.
Cinesias So help me Zeus, I hope to die if I do!

The full value of the wish can be hierarchically paraphrased as: I wish (realizable wish illocution) that then (ἄρα) I would die (ἀπολοίμην). My compensatory translation with “then” attempts to represent the inference which Cinesias subjectively draws from Myrrhine’s suggestion that he would not keep his promises. Furthermore, the realizable death wish betrays an idiomatic language principle at work for death wishes to one’s self. There seems to be a usage principle that if a situation is that bad with regard to something/someone, one could say, in a figurative fashion, that one would die. In fact, English uses
comparable expressions to ones found in Ancient Greek which follow such a principle: I’d rather die than talk to you;\textsuperscript{25} May I die if I ever...\textsuperscript{26}

**Wishes with ἦ**

The rare examples with ἦ importantly only occur together with ἄρα. The context is essential to understanding these examples. In the first example, Hippolytus has just defended himself against the accusation from his father Theseus that Hippolytus raped his mother which allegedly caused her to kill herself (as stated in her departing letter). The problem for Hippolytus is that he cannot tell his father everything he knows. He, for example, would especially want to tell him that Phaedra was in love with him, but he has sworn an oath to the nurse who told him this information that he would not ever share the information with anyone else.

(7) Hippolytus νῦν δ’ ὅρκιόν σοι Ζῆνα καὶ πέδον χθονὸς ἦ τἄρ’ ὀλοίμην ἀκλεὴς ἀνώνυμος ἄπολις ἄοικος, φυγὰς ἀλητεύων χθόνα, καὶ μήτε πόντος μήτε γῆ δέξαιτό μου σάρκας θανόντος, εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ. (E. Hipp. 1025–1031)

As things stand, I swear by Zeus, god of oaths, and by the earth beneath me that I never touched your wife, never wished to, never had the thought. May I truly then perish with no name or reputation, [cityless, homeless, wandering the earth an exile,] and may neither sea nor earth receive my corpse if I am guilty! (transl. Kovacs, slightly adapted)

As a result of the situation of utmost despair, Hippolytus has to resort to swearing an oath to Zeus (lines 1025–1027) stating never to having desired his mother, in order to convince his father. Now that Theseus has called Hippolytus the culprit, Hippolytus wishes that he truly would die if he is the guilty party (cf. εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ). Importantly, the final part of the wish, the post-posed conditional clause (“if I am guilty”), modifies the wish value into a strong declaration of commitment or “pseudo-self-damnation”.\textsuperscript{27} As described well

\textsuperscript{25} Compare E. Hipp. 364: ὀλοίμαν ἔγωγε πρὶν σῶν, φίλα, κατανύσαι φρενῶν. “May death take me, my friend, before I come to share your thoughts!” (transl. Kovacs)

\textsuperscript{26} Compare E. Alc. 1096: θάνοιμ’ ἐκεῖνην καίπερ οὐκ οὕδασαν προδοοῦ. “May I die if I ever betray her”. (transl. Kovacs)

\textsuperscript{27} For a discussion of this type of combination with a conditional, see Wakker 1994: 189 who calls these instances “pseudo-self-damnation” and Revuelta Puigdollers
by Wakker 1994: 189–190, this type of postposed condition invites the addressee “to give a special, non-standard, interpretation to the conditional since he knows that either p [i.e. the conditional clause $ELR$] or q [i.e. the main clause with the wish $ELR$] is obviously true or false”. In the current example Theseus is led to infer that Hippolytus is not guilty, i.e. not κακὸς πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ, as Hippolytus has argued from the start.

In the next example of the combination this type of post-posed conditional clause is absent, but the context of utmost despair is equally prominent. Alcmene is under the impression that men have come to take away her grandchildren. She therefore makes it very clear that they will not be able to do so while she is still alive.

(8) Alcmene

μῶν τίς σ’ αὖ βιάζεται παρόν κήρος ἀπ’ Ἀργοὺς; ἀσθενής μὲν ἢ γ’ ἐμὴ ρώμη, τοσόνδε δ’ εἰδέναι σε χρή, ξένε, σοκ ἔστ’ ἄγειν σε τούσδ’ ἐμοὶ ζώσης ποτέ. ἦ τἄρ’ ἐκείνου μὴ νομιζοίμην εγὼ μήτηρ ἔτ’· εἰ δὲ τῶνδε προσθίξῃ χερί, δυοῖν γερόντοιν οὐ καλῶς ἀγωνιῇ. (E. Heracl. 647–653)

Has a herald come a second time from Argos to do you violence? My strength may be weak, stranger, but you must realize this: you cannot remove these children while I still live. May I truly then no longer be regarded as Heracles’ mother! If you lay a hand on them, you will struggle ignominiously with a pair of grey-heads. (transl. Kovacs, slightly adapted)

Again we see how the subjective particles ἦ and ἄρα specify the speaker’s subjective beliefs and inference respectively, which scope over the non-subjective possibility that Alcmene would not be considered Heracles’ mother anymore.

4. Pragmatic values of realizable wishes

In this section I will examine realizable wish illocutions in their own right by assessing their illocutionary force in context and the role of the particles εἴθε, εἰ γάρ and νυν in the composition of realizable wish illocutions. First, however, I will provide some relevant theoretical background to the notion of illocution, a notion often used but not
often expanded upon theoretically. From typological research we know that each language distinguishes between illocutions differently. As Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 68 state, “There is no one-to-one relation between a specific communicative intention and an Illocution, as languages may differ significantly in the extent to which they make use of linguistic means to differentiate between communicative intentions”. To grammaticalize these distinctions, languages can use, for example, moods, particles, performative verbs, modal verbs, affixes and negation. How a language grammaticalizes those communicative intentions is language-specific. The view of FDG is that languages choose to distinguish between certain basic illocutions, “defined as grammatical structures that can be related to a default communicative intention”, comparable to basic sentence types. Languages use structures with predetermined illocutions, e.g. performative verbs such as “promise” which specify the commissive illocution of the Discourse Act or a set of limited interjection-like expressions which already possess their own expressive illocutionary value such as “damn” or “thank you”. Languages also use morphological means such as moods for multiple possible illocutions, for example the optative mood for declarative, interrogative and wish illocutions.

Now I turn to how Classical Greek distinguishes the communicative intention of a realizable wish illocution, OPTATIVE in FDG terminology. Of course, OPTATIVES can be formally distinguished from potential optatives by the absence of ἄν and the use of μή for negation instead of οὐ(κ). Syntactically speaking, realizable wishes in Classical Greek typically occur in main clauses, but can also occur in relative clauses. I found several occurrences of these types of wishes for example:

29 There could be implicational hierarchies which might model the choices of specific languages to grammaticalize certain illocutions, see Hengeveld et al. 2007.
30 Hengeveld et al. 2007: 73.
31 See Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 68–84. They list the illocutions: declarative, interrogative, imperative, prohibitive, optative, imprecative, hortative, dishortative, admonitive, commissive, suppositive and mirative.
32 Following the World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS), I prefer this term over desiderative (as for example used by Revuelta Puigdollers 2017), because desiderative is more often used in linguistics and typology to refer to a participant’s desire, e.g. the subject of the sentence, as expressed by modal verbs (e.g. Cristofaro 2003: 99) rather than the speaker’s desire, Dobrushina, van der Auwera and Goussev 2013. Some languages (e.g. Nganasan (Songhay, Uralic; northern Russia) even have specialized desiderative morphology.
33 See also E. Alc. 1023, Heracl. 714, Ar. Ach. 1153 and Lys. 340.
Calonice εἰ δ’ ὡς μάλιστ’ ἀπεχοίμεθ’ οὗ σὺ δὴ λέγεις, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, μᾶλλον ἂν διὰ τουτογὶ γένοιτ’ ἂν εἰρήνη; (Ar. Lys. 146–148)

Well, what if we did abstain from, uh, what you say, which heaven forbid: would peace be likelier to come on that account? (transl. Henderson)

The interactive functions of realizable wishes in my view all share one common illocutionary value (table 3, top row), but they have three distinct contextualized functions (columns below). All realizable wishes express the speaker’s psychological commitment to the occurrence of the realizable state of affairs, that is, that s/he sincerely wants the state of affairs to be realized. In context, they are used by speakers to express support (first lower column), ask for resolution (second lower column) or declare one’s strong commitment (third lower column). In other words, realizable wishes are generally used to show the addressee(s) how one is psychologically disposed towards the realization of a state of affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological commitment to realizable state of affairs</th>
<th>Align positive psychological commitment34</th>
<th>Wishing for resolution35</th>
<th>Strong declaration of commitment36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- (emotional) support</td>
<td>(Ar. Eq. 618)</td>
<td>(E. Hec. 1067)</td>
<td>- declaration of commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- oaths</td>
<td>(Ar. Lys. 236)</td>
<td>(Ar. Th. 1051)</td>
<td>with preceding or following condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- conventionalized best wishes</td>
<td>(E. Hel. 159)</td>
<td>(E. Hipp. 87)</td>
<td>(E. Alc. 1096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- retribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- own demise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- curses</td>
<td>Often with vocatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Table 3 overview of the pragmatic functions of realizable wishes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other ways to specify one’s degree of psychological commitment are verbs of volition (e.g. βούλομαι), evaluative adjectives (e.g. κακός), interjections (e.g. φεῦ) or expressions committing to future actions which entail a speaker’s psychological commitment (e.g. futures, subjunctives or potential optatives).

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34 Some other examples from my corpus are: Ar. Ach. 446, 457, Eccl. 476, Ran 1417, Lys 285, E. Alc. 1135, 1153, Hel. 645 and Id 1626. Conventionalized best wishes often take one of the three forms: εὐδαιμονοί-, ὄναι- or positive adjective/adverb+εἴη-/γένοιτο.

35 Some other examples from my corpus are: Ar. Ach. 833, Av. 2, 1337, Nub. 1236, Eccl. 776, 977, Ran 86, Lys. 1037, E. Andr. 449 and IT 441.

36 The rest of the examples from my corpus are: Ar. Ach. 151, 324, Ran 575, V. 630, Eq. 400, 401, 695, 770–772, E. Id 1006–1007, El 663, Or 1147 and Cyc. 270–272.
Importantly, the key feature of psychological commitment aligns well with recent classifications of wishes in Greek and Latin as a separate speech act category in between directives and expressives.37 In my opinion, realizable wishes display a greater affinity with expressives, i.e. illocutions that express the speaker’s feelings, because they have to do with the speaker’s psychological disposition (cf. example 10 below) but they only have possible directive side-effects. For example, what clearly differentiates OPTATIVES from directives is their distribution in person, since OPTATIVES also often occur in the first person (see table 4 below and example 10) and are most frequent in third person whereas directives are in second person.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>1SG</th>
<th>2SG</th>
<th>3SG</th>
<th>1PL</th>
<th>2PL</th>
<th>3PL</th>
<th>DUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>occurrences</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 person distribution realizable wishes

(10) Orestes μητέρος δὲ μὴ 'σίδοιμι μνῆμα. (E. Or. 798)
As for my mother’s grave, may I never look on it! (transl. Kovacs)

In particular, on a theatrical level, these first person wishes serve to characterize a character’s emotional dealings with events to the audience.

The possible directive side-effect of OPTATIVES means that, under specific contextual conditions, realizable wishes may be interpreted as an incentive to the addressee to act, especially when the speaker has some type of power over the hearer(s), for example as a manager, friend, idol or mentor (cf. example 11 below).38 I will now briefly discuss one example from each type.

(11) Medea καὶ μὴ μ’ ἔρημον ἐκπεσοῦσαν εἰσίδῃς, δέξαι δὲ χώρᾳ καὶ δόμοις ἐφέστιον. οὕτως ἔρως σοὶ πρὸς θεῶν τελεσφόρος γένοιτο παίδων καυτὸς δόμιος θάνοις. (E. Med. 712–715)
And do not allow me to be cast into exile without a friend, but receive me into your land and your house as a suppliant.

38 A modern day parallel of the possible directive side-effects of a wish can be found in the controversy surrounding Trump, his national security advisor Flynn and FBI director Comey. Comey has testified that Trump, his superior, had uttered the wish to him that the FBI would investigate Flynn’s contacts with Russia, supposedly in order to get rid of Flynn. Comey had interpreted this as an order from his superior, but Trump subsequently took advantage of the possibility of maintaining that he did not order Comey to conduct such an investigation.
If you do so, may your longing for children be brought to fulfillment by the gods, and may you yourself die happy! (transl. Kovacs)

Here Medea expresses her emotional support to Aegeus in an attempt to influence his decision by aligning her stance with his personal desires.39 Thus, by portraying herself as a friend who shares Aegeus’ wishes she tries and, in fact, manages, to sway Aegeus to help her. In the next example, the speaker’s wish aims at resolution. The Kinsman (of Euripides) wishes that his torturer, the Skythian archer, will be destroyed.

(12) Kinsman ὁ κατάρατος ἐγώ·
tίς ἐμὸν οὐκ ἐπόψεται
πάθος ἀμέγαρτον ἐπὶ κακῶν παρουσία;
εἴθε μὲ πυρφόρος αἰθέρος ἀστήρ –
tὸν βárβαρον ἐξολέσειεν. (Ar. Th. 1047–1051)
O me accursed!
Who will not behold my suffering, with its drastic evils, as unenviable?
Ah may a fiery bolt from heaven obliterate that barbarian! (transl. Henderson)

The last example exemplifies the strong declaration of commitment type, which we have discussed in example 7, although the post-posed condition is now articulated through a participle.

(13) Heracles αἰνῶ μὲν αἰνῶ· μωρίαν δ’ ὀφλισκάνεις.
Admetus ὡς μῆποτ’ ἄνδρα τόνδε νυμφίον καλῶν.
Heracl. ἐπῄνεσ’ ἀλόχῳ πιστὸς οὕνεκ’ εἶ φίλος.
Admetus θάνοιμ’ ἐκείνην καίπερ οὐκ οὖσαν προδούς. (E. Alc. 1093–1096)
Heracles I commend you, truly. But you deserve the name of fool.
Admetus You will never call this man a bridegroom.
Heracles I commend you for being faithful to your wife.
Admetus May I die if ever I betray her, even though she is gone! (transl. Kovacs)

Although it is more common to find such wishes with a following condition, I also found some strong commitment wishes with a preceding condition,40 as in the following example:

39 For the manipulatory effects of Medea’s language, see Allan 2007.
40 The possibility of a preceding condition in such wishes is not mentioned by Wakker 1994: 189–190 or Revuelta Puigdollers 2005: 5–6. Other examples are: E. Cyc. 270–272 and Ar. Eq. 400, 401, 695 and 770–772.
Given Achilles’ preceding utterance that he won’t lie, it is obvious that the condition which precedes the wish is to be interpreted as false by the addressee. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the following wish μη θάνομι does not turn into a strong declaration of commitment due to a non-standard interpretation of the conditional that follows the wish. In think that the fact that μη θάνομι “May I not die” effectively means “May I live”, blocks the possibility of a pseudo-self-damnation reading.

Finally, just as other illocutions have sincerity conditions to felicitably perform an illocution, for example interrogative illocutions that the speaker genuinely wants an answer, or commissive illocutions that the speaker genuinely commits to the intention, I propose that OPTATIVES have the sincerity condition that the speaker genuinely is psychologically committed to the full realization of the wish. Otherwise, there would be no point in using an OPTATIVE for oaths, expressing genuine support or strong commitment. Moreover, as we have seen in example 5 and will see in more examples below, a lack of sincerity to the full realization of the wish changes the interpretation of the wish illocution, for instance in example 5 from a sincere death wish to figurative damnation.

Wishes with είθε and εὶ γάρ

Schwyzer and Debrunner claim that the wish optative rarely lacks either είθε or εὶ γάρ (Schwyzer and Debrunner 1950: 321) and that their origin must be sought in an interjectional expression. Goodwin and others prefer to see their origin in a conditional marker, similar to counterfactual English “if only”. Wakker 1994: 384–399 has presented an illuminating discussion of the theories about the origin of conditional clauses, where she also concludes with respect to είθε that they derived from conditionals, a view which goes
back as far as Aristarchus. More importantly, she concludes that “on a synchronic level wishes introduced by εἰ γάρ etc. can very well be considered conditional clauses without an apodosis”. (Wakker 1994: 395–396). However, she does not mention what the exact conditional value is that εἴθε and εἰ γάρ synchronically express or provide other evidence for this claim. Although previous development from conditionals is possible for Homeric Greek, it is in my opinion wrong to suggest that εἴθε and εἰ γάρ still function as conditionals in Classical Greek when introducing realizable wishes.

These particles are not translatable as conditionals in Classical Greek wishes and seeing them as conditionals, in my opinion, fails to take into account the influence of diachrony on these particles. First of all, it is a known fact that particles acquire new meanings over time (Allan 2018). Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the particles associated with the wish optative in Homeric Greek would retain some conditional value, when the wish optative has lost its counterfactual value from Homeric to Classical Greek. To exemplify my point on diachrony, Denniston suggested that there is some kind of approving force in εἰ γάρ because of the presence of γάρ and partly because the combination is often found in answers. He also concludes that γάρ has some kind of adverbial strengthening force as -θε in εἴθε, but such views are impossible to prove. Moreover, I do not think that it is worthwhile to endeavour to demarcate a value for γάρ or, -θε in these types of combinations, because it appears impossible to undertake this in an uncontroversial manner. Since the combinations had already been used for hundreds of years before Classical Greek they must have been semantically and pragmatically fixed as a combination and their meanings fused into a novel combination. This makes a compositional analysis of the components of εἴθε and εἰ γάρ too difficult for Classical Greek and this is an important reason why the particles can, at least no longer, be seen as conditionals.

Wakker 1994: 384–399. She divides previous views on the origin of conditional clauses (under which she subsumes wishes with εἰ, εἴθε and εἰ γάρ) into two camps. The first camp argues that conditionals developed out of wishes and the second that wishes are derived from conditionals. Apart from some more specific differences, those sharing the former view are Kühner and Gerth 1904, van Pottelbergh 1939, Schweizer and Debrunner 1950, Humbert 1954, Chantraine 1963, Ruigh 1971, Lange 1972 and Brunel 1980. Those sharing the latter view are Monro 1891, Goodwin 1889 and Tabachovitz 1951.

In fact, recent cross-linguistic research has demonstrated that a process called insubordination often causes previously conditional clauses to, among others, turn into wish clauses, eventually changing a formerly subordinate structure to an insubordinate one, Evans and Watanabe 2016. Since this diachronic matter exceeds the scope of this paper, I aim to discuss it in a future paper.
More recently the particles εἴθε and εἰ γάρ have been classified by Allan 2015 as illocution-marking particles which “indicate whether the clause is an assertion, a question, a command, an exclamation or a wish”. Nevertheless, this classification does not explain why and when the particles are absent from realizable wishes in Classical Greek. In fact, these particles are not necessary for the formulation of realizable wishes in Classical Greek. Even though εἴθε and εἰ γάρ are most often seen as characteristic of realizable wishes, realizable wishes in Classical Greek occur rarely with εἴθε or εἰ γάρ. The combinations with εἴθε and εἰ γάρ occur at least 10 times less often (!) than those without these particles in Euripides and Aristophanes, because there are at least 337 wish optatives without εἴθε and εἰ γάρ in Euripides and Aristophanes as opposed to 24 with εἴθε and 12 with εἰ γάρ. This seems to suggest that εἴθε and εἰ γάρ code a contextually necessary pragmatic value. In the following I will use the notion of Common Ground to explain when these particles are contextually necessary, thereby applying the notion to the domain of modality for the first time.

The Common Ground contains “the sum of [interlocutors’] mutual, common or joint knowledge beliefs, and suppositions” (Clark 1996: 96). To negotiate certain views, speakers assess what values, knowledge and beliefs are already accepted and shared with their interlocutors (i.e. interpersonally accessible information) in order to fit their messages to the current communicative context. Metaphorically speaking, they tend to anchor50 their messages to the Common Ground of the conversation, that is, the amount of shared knowledge, ideas and values.

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46 Similarly, Denizot 2011: 80 keeps to the view that the particles distinctively mark the wish value, a view which goes back as far as Apollonios Dyscolos, see Denizot 2011: 76.
47 As explained in note 8, there are at least 372 wish optatives in Aristophanes and Euripides combined.
48 So far it has only been applied to adversative particles, see Allan 2017.
49 For the application of this term in linguistic analysis, see Stalnaker 1978, 2002, Clark and Brennan 1991 and Clark 1996. This notion is different from the Cognitive Grammar notion of “grounding” which uses a different notion of ground than the one used here.
50 I owe this anchoring metaphor to the recent project called “anchoring innovation” within the research school of classical studies (Oikos) in the Netherlands and its application to adversative particles by Allan and van Gils forthc.
Table 5 Types of Common Ground

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Common Ground</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>Shared cultural knowledge and values, social practices, shared attitudes or conventional human behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal based on physical copresence of interlocutors</td>
<td>Joint experience (of any kind) of the physical domain of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal based on linguistic copresence</td>
<td>Information, views, ideas shared in prior interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What I will argue below is that speakers use εἴθε and εἰ γάρ when their current psychological commitment has not been sufficiently established in the interlocutors’ Common Ground.51

In example 15 Cinesias changes his mind on whether his wife is vile for toying with his feelings, as the men’s leader suggested. Consequently, he uses εἴθε with the wish optative to mark that his psychological commitment in the Common Ground has now changed (see μιαρὰ δῆτ).

(15) Leader Ταυτὶ μέντοι νυνί σ’ ἐπόησ’ ἡ παμβδελύρα καὶ παμμυσάρα. Cinesias Μὰ Δί’ ἀλλὰ φίλη καὶ παγγλυκέρα.
Leader ποία γλυκερά; μιαρὰ μιαρὰ. Cinesias μιαρὰ δῆτ’ ὀ Ζεῦ ὦ Ζεῦ. εἴθ’ αὐτὴν ὡσπερ τοὺς θωμοὺς μεγάλῳ τυφῷ καὶ πρηστῆρι νεμών καὶ χυγγογγύλας οἶχοιο φέρων, εἶτα μεθείης, ἡ δὲ φέροιτ᾽ αὖ πάλιν ἐς τὴν γῆν, κᾆτ᾽ ἐξαίφνης περὶ τὴν ψωλὴν περιβαίη. (Ar. Lys. 968–979)
Leader And this is what she’s done to you, the detestable, revolting shrew!
Cinesias No, she’s totally sweet and dear!
Leader Sweet, you say! She’s vile, vile!
Cinesias Yes, vile, vile! O Zeus, Zeus, please hit her like a heap of grain with a great tornado and firestorm, sweeping her up and twirling her into the sky, and then let go and let her fall back down to earth again, to land smack dab on the point of my hard-on! (transl. Henderson)

In example 16 the psychological commitment of Epigenes is not yet in the Common Ground, as the gods were invoked to the Common

51 The specialization, as it were, of these particles to this function may well have been one of the many outcomes of the reorganisations of the Greek mood system initiated in Homeric Greek, as, for example, wish optatives to only realizable wishes instead of unrealizable wishes as well. See Hettrich 1998 and Allan 2013.
Ground to help Epigenes to entice the young girl next door. This type of wish to physically absent persons, deities or entities occurred more often in my corpus with εἴθε.52

(16) Epigenes εἴθ’ εξῆν παρὰ τῇ νέᾳ καθεύδειν, καὶ μὴ ’ονείον διασποδήσαι ἀνάσιμον ἢ πρεσβυτέραν. οὐ γὰρ ἀνασχετόν τοῦτο γ’ ἐλευθέρω.

Old woman οἷμον νῆρα νή Δία σποδήσεις. οὐ γὰρ ταῖς Χαριζένης ταῦτ’ ἐστίν. κατὰ τὸν νόμον ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστὶ δίκιον, εἰ δημοκρατούμεθα. ἀλλ’ εἰμὶ τηρήσομι’ ὃ τι καὶ ὀράσει ποτὲ.

Epigenes εἴθ’, ὦ θεοί, λάβοιμι τὴν καλὴν μόνην, ἐφ’ ἣν πεπωκὼς ἔρχομ αι πάλαι ποθῶν. (Ar. Ec. 938–947)

Epigenes I wish I could sleep with the girl and didn’t first have to bang a pug-nose or a crone! This doesn’t sit well with a free man. (First Old Woman reappears.)

Old woman Then by heaven you’ll bang to your sorrow; this isn’t Charixene’s heydey. If we still live under democracy, we’ve got to do this legal and proper! But I’ll go inside to see what he ends up doing. (First Old Woman goes back inside.)

Epigenes Ye gods, let me catch this pretty girl alone! It’s her I’ve come for in my cups, her I’ve long desired. (transl. Kovacs)

In the next example Iolaos has told us in the prologue about the hardship that he and his grandchildren (i.e. Heracles’) have suffered as a consequence of Eurystheus’ actions. When a herald subsequently arrives, he suddenly sincerely wishes that this messenger will die. In my opinion, εἴθ’ is present, because Iolaos sincerely wishes that the herald will die, whereas this expectation exceeds those in the Common Ground for the herald. Some hostility might have been expected by the herald, but a sincere death wish is in my view only warranted in true situations of life and death.

(17) Iolaos ὦ τέκνα τέκνα, δεῦρο, λαμβάνεσθ’ ἐμὸν πέπλων· ὁρῶ κήρυκα τόνδ’ Εὐρυσθέως στείχοντ’ ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς, οὗ διωκόμεσθ’ ὅπασῆς ἀλῆται γῆς ἀπεστερημένοι. ὦ μῖσος, εἴθ’ ὄλοιο πολλὰ κακά. (E. Heracl. 48–54)

See E. Andr. 523 (Hector), IT 440 (Helen), Rh. 367 (Rhesus), Hipp. 230 (Artemis), 1074 (palace) and Hec. 1067 (sun).
Iolaos  O children, children, come here, take hold of my garments! I see Eurystheus’ herald coming toward us, the man by whom we are pursued and banished as wanderers from the face of the earth! A curse on you, hateful creature, and on him who sent you! For on these children’s noble father too your tongue laid many a woe! (transl. Kovacs)

To complete the analysis of εἴθε, I turn to a contrastive example. Contrastive examples are highly instructive, but unfortunately difficult to find. Here we encounter another change of heart by Cinesias, on whether he wants scent as he had previously made it clear to Myrrhine that he did not want any scent at all.

(18) Myrrhine  βούλει μυρίσω σε;  
Cinesias  μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω μὴ ’μέ γε.  
Myrrhine  νῇ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, ἣν τε βούλη γ’ ᾐ ν τε μή.  
Cinesias  εἴθ’ ἐκχυθεῖη τὸ μύρον, ὦ Ζεῦ δέσποτα.  
Myrrhine  πρότανε δὴ τὴν χεῖρα κάλειφο που αὐτὸ.  
Cinesias  οὐδ’ ἢ δό τὸ μύρον μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω τουτογί,  
εἰ μὴ διωματικόν γε κοῦ δὼν γάμων.  
Myrrhine  τάλαιν’ ἐγὼ, τὸ Ῥόδιον ἔνεγκον μύρον.  
Cinesias  ἀγαθὸν <γ’>· ἐα αὐτ’, ὦ δαμοῦρα.  
Myrrhine  ληρεῖς ἔχων.  
Cinesias  κάκιστ’ ἀπόλλωθ’ ὁ πρῶτος ἐνήσας μύρον. (Ar. Lys. 938–946)  
Myrrhine  Want some scent?  
Cinesias  Apollo no, none for me.  
Myrrhine  But I will, so help me Aphrodite, whether you like it or not.  
Cinesias  Let the scent flow! Lord Zeus!  
Myrrhine (returning with a round bottle of perfume) Hold out your hand. Take some and rub it in.  
Cinesias  I really dislike this scent; it takes a long time warming up and it doesn’t smell conjugal.  
Myrrhine  Oh silly me, I brought the Rhodian scent!  
Cinesias  It’s fine! Let it go, you screwy woman!  
Myrrhine  What are you babbling about?  
Cinesias  Goddamn the man who first decocted scent! (transl. Henderson)

His change of heart is marked by the wish optative with εἴθε, expressing his new psychological commitment to the wish that the scent will flow. Instead of proceeding to love making after solving the scent problem, Myrrhine brings up another issue with the scent to annoy Cinesias. In the subsequent wish without εἴθε, Cinesias shares his frustration about the scent by damning the person who first decocted the scent. Since Cinesias’ lack of sincerity is contextually clear, the wish is used figuratively as correctly translated and represented with “goddamn”. Cinesias wishes that the inventor of scent becomes ill-fated due to his frustration of the scent in the current
The Variation of Classical Greek Wishes

situation. Consequently, the wish differs from the genuine death wish by Iolaos in the previous example as it lacks the sincerity condition of wishes and lacks εἴθε because his hatred against scent is now in the interlocutors’ Common Ground.

The presence of εἰ γάρ has the same Common Ground motivation as εἴθε, signalling that the speaker’s current psychological commitment to the wished state of affairs was not sufficiently established in the interlocutors’ Common Ground. In example 19 Theseus has to mark his psychological commitment to his death because he has not spoken since Hippolytus came on stage. Consequently, Hippolytus is unaware of his father’s wish to replace him as the person who is to die, as his father’s death wish is not in their Common Ground.

(19) Artemis ἐξηπατήθη δαίμονος βουλεύμασιν.
    Hippolytus ὦ δυστάλας σὺ τῆσδε συμφορᾶς, πάτερ.
    Theseus ὅλωλα, τέκνο, οὐδέ μοι χάρις βίου.
    Hippolytus στένω σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ 'μὲ τῆς ἁμαρτίας.
    Artemis He was deceived, a god contrived it so.
    Hippolytus How great, unhappy father, your misfortune!
    Theseus I am gone, my son, I have no joy in life.
    Hippolytus For your mistake I pity you more than me.
    Theseus May I die, my son, instead of you!53 (transl. Kovacs, slightly adapted)

After a period of silence on the part of Theseus, he suddenly joins in on the wailing and wishes that it will be possible to save Hippolytus by dying instead of him. Note that the previous wish for death by Theseus in line 1325 does not block the use of εἰ γάρ, because Hippolytus was not present on stage until line 1347 and is therefore unaware of his father’s commitment to replace him. Also, the fact that Theseus had said in line 1408 that he, figuratively speaking, died (ὅλωλα), does not mean that his wish to die is added to the linguistic Common Ground, since wanting to die is something different than saying to have died. If he would have wanted to express that he wants

53 Kovacs, in my view, wrongly translates the wish as an unrealizable wish: “Would I could die, my son, instead of you”. The wish optative for unrealizable wishes belongs to Homeric and not Classical Greek, Hettrich 1998. Also, the realizable wish contrasts here with the subsequent unrealizable wish by Theseus to have never uttered the curse. The latter naturally is unrealizable, but Theseus’ wish to die is still realizable and a means to convince Artemis to let him die instead of his son. Artemis, however, in 1415 settles the argument by explaining that Hippolytus will have to die.
to die, he would have used other expressions, for example of desire or volition.

The Common Ground motivation for εἰ γάρ appears even clearer in a context where the marking of psychological commitment with εἰ γάρ is used to deceive someone. In order to escape with her brother and Pylades, Iphigeneia has created the following stratagem. She tells king Thoas that the strangers (Oreste s and Pylades) need to be ritually cleansed at sea and that Thoas must forbid citizens to come near whilst this takes place. Most importantly, the king must cover himself with his cloak whilst she performs these rituals. Below she is instructing king Thoas in order to let her secret plan succeed.

(20) Iphigeneia ἡνίκ’ ἄν δ’ ἔξω περῶσιν οἱ ξένοι
Thoas τί χρή με δρᾶν;
Iphigeneia πέπλον ὀμμάτων προθέσθαι.
Thoas μὴ παλαμναῖον λάβω.
Iphigeneia ἴν δ’ ἄγαν δοκῶ χρονίζειν.
Thoas τοῦδ’ ὥρος τίς ἄκο αὐτής μοι;
Iphigeneia θαυμάσῃς μηδέν.
Thoas τὰ τῆς θεοῦ πρᾶσσ’ – ἐπεὶ σχολή – καλὸς.
Iphigeneia εἰ γὰρ ὡς θέλω καθαρμὸς ὅδε πέσοι.
Thoas συνεύχομαι.

In her plan to deceive Thoas and escape, Iphigeneia had to feign willingness to help Thoas. In the previous context, both agreed to let Iphigeneia cleanse Pylades and Orestes with the statue at sea so that they can be sacrificied to Artemis, thereby placing their commitment to purification measures in the Common Ground. Here, she ends her instructions with the wish to Thoas that things may turn out as she wants. For us as an audience, the addition of ὡς θέλω is essential, as we already know that she is not committed to the same outcome as Thoas. Consequently, Iphigeneia’s sincere commitment to the wish that things come out as she wants is not in the Common Ground with Thoas, since he does not know that she actually wants to use the purification measures as a subterfuge to escape with Py lades, Orestes and the statue. Although the support wish by Iphigeneia may suggest...
to the gullable Thoas that she is committed to the previously agreed purification measures, we as an audience know the difference in commitment between the two. In other words, ὡς θέλω introduces the tragic irony of Thoas’ future downfall.

In the following contrastive context, the first wish seems to lack marking because the chorus has already added their positive psychological attitude towards Rhesus to the linguistic Common Ground. In the first lines of the sample, they have called him φίλος Διόθεν and welcomed his words, thereby indicating their support to the plans which Rhesus has just shared with them. This support adds to the praise which they already gave him at lines 380–387 when he had just arrived, where they compared him to a god. With the first wish, they thus present their positive attitude toward Rhesus, which they had already explicated in the linguistic Common Ground. By contrast, the next wish εἰ γὰρ is motivated by the fact that it does not concern Rhesus but the Chorus itself. The fact that they long to see the day of retribution by Rhesus seems to exceed Rhesus’ knowledge regarding the chorus’ wishes.

(21) Chorus ἰὼ ἰὼ.
φίλα θροεῖς, φίλος Διόθεν εἰ· μόνον
φθόνον ἄμαχον ὕπατος
Ζεὺς θέλει εἰργεῖν.
τὸ δὲ νάιον Ἀργόθεν δόρυ
οὔτε πρὶν τιν’ οὔτε νῦν
ἀνδρῶν ἐπόρευσε σέθεν κρεῖσσω.
πῶς μοι Ἀχιλεὺς τὸ σὸν ἔγχος ἂν δύναιτο,
πῶς δ’ Αἴας ὑπομεῖναι;
εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ τόδ’ ἦμαρ
ἄναξ,
ὅτῳ πολυφόνου
χειρὸς † ἀποινάσαιο † λόγχᾳ (E. Rh. 454–466)
Chorus Hurrah! Welcome are your words, and you are a welcome arrival sent by Zeus!
Only may Zeus on high grant that the gods not take offense at your words!
Neither before this nor now has a ship from Argos brought a man superior to you. Tell me, how can Achilles withstand your spear, how can Ajax? O that I may see that day, my lord, when by your spear you exact retribution for their murderous deeds. (transl. Kovacs, slightly adapted)

Wishes with νῦν
The particle νῦν has evolved from the temporal adverb νῦν (“now”) into a discourse particle. In FGD terminology, it evolved into an operator of the layer of the Move, the highest hierarchical layer of the interpersonal level (Allan 2018). In its preceding evolutionary stage (see
the table below), νυν occurs with directives and “reinforces the strength of the directive” by emphasizing its urgency. In that combination, Allan states, there may be “a weak consequential force (“so”, “therefore”)” to the particle’s use. What is, however, unclear, with respect to the wish optative, is whether νυν similarly strengthens the wish optative when combined, since Allan did not mention its occurrence with the optative mood. Ruiz Yamuza 2014 and 2015 had argued for more meanings of νυν (which were not incorporated into Allan’s classification) but did not discuss the combination with the wish optative. Given my focus on the wish optative, I refrain here from comparing both proposals more fully. Rather, I will argue that νυν acts as an operator of the layer of the discourse act when it is combined with the semantically epistemic wish optative. With this use νυν expresses that the Discourse Act with the epistemic wish illocution is a consequence from the previous Discourse Acts in the Common Ground. Diachronically, this value can be interpreted as the intermediate stage between the meaning at the layer of the illocution (stage 2) and the Move (stage 4), since the layer of the Discourse Act is situated in between those and lacking in Allan’s diachronic reconstruction.

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55 Allan 2018: 112–113 only specifies how this meaning combines with the value of directives saying that “The particle, in other words, signals to the addressee that the preceding discourse segment served as a preparation justifying the performance of the action expressed by the command”. Revuelta Puigdollers 2017: 25 wrongly suggests that νυν is only compatible with the directive sentence type and not that of the wish optative, what he calls the desiderative sentence type. The occurrence of νυν in its function on the layer of the Move also disproves that, because it occurs in the declarative sentence type as well there.
56 She distinguishes the following meanings: “cambio de tópico” (νῦν), “conector contraargumentativo” (νῦν δῆ), “conector consecutivo/ilativo” (καὶ νῦν/ νῦν οὖν/Μὴ νῦν+imperative), “efecto colateral: emotividad” (Καὶ νῦν/Νῦν δῆ/Νῦν τε +rhetorical question or directive) and “introducción del turno de palabra” (Νῦν δῆ/ νῦν οὖν).
57 Allan 2018 makes no reference to her article, but their findings partly overlap. For future harmonising I think that the difference which Allan makes between contextually evoked associations or implicatures and actually coded pragmatic meanings will be essential. This might allow some of Ruiz Yamuza’s classifications to be put under Allan’s labels. Also, the observations on Homeric Greek by Conti 2018 should be incorporated into the diachronic overview.
58 As such, it differs from the value Ruiz Yamuza distinguishes for νῦν (not νυν!) as “conector consecutivo/ilativo”, since I limit this meaning to a specific hierarchical layer and the occurrence with the wish optative.
To substantiate my proposal, I first discuss the layer of the Move and Discourse Act in order to explain the combinations with the wish optative.

In FDG, the Move constitutes the highest hierarchical layer on the interpersonal level. It constitutes “an autonomous contribution to an ongoing interaction” (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 50). Often it consists of several Discourse Acts, although sometimes one Discourse Act corresponds to a speakers entire move. A Discourse Act is “the smallest identifiable unit of communicative behaviour” and typically consists of one intonation contour. The Move, on the other hand, often corresponds to a turn in conversation, which typically consists of several hierarchically ordered Discourse Acts: one central and (possibly) several other subsidiary. Those Discourse Acts can mark “consequence, concession, conclusion, contrast, elaboration, evidence, motivation, restatement, specification, etc.” (Allan 2015: 6). One final important difference between Moves and Discourse Acts lies in their interactive function. The Move characteristically urges the addressee to react (e.g. with an answer, an objection etc.), thereby stimulating the addressee for a Move. The Discourse Act, on the other hand, typically provides backchannel, a response which encourages the speaker to continue. By way of contrast to the Move, the Discourse Act does not “necessarily further the communication in terms of approaching a conversational goal” (Kroon 1995: 65).

In its discourse-structural use on the layer of the Move, νῦν (in the combination μέν νῦν) signals the transition to a new discourse segment. The particle νῦν in the example below provides a coherence bridge with the upcoming Move. In this context, the particle combi-

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Table 6: the evolution of νῦν to νῦν

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Layer and Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Absolute temporal adverb</td>
<td>Episode, Representational level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Attitudinal illocutionary particle (with directives)</td>
<td>Illocution, Interpersonal level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consequential particle <em>(ELR)</em></td>
<td>Discourse Act, Interpersonal level <em>(ELR)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Discourse-structural particle (typically as μέν νῦν… δέ)</td>
<td>Move, Interpersonal level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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60 Note that Wakker 2009: 79 distinguishes a similar function for νῦν in the combination τοίνυν.

61 I took this example from Allan 2018: 114.
nation signals the transition from the reporting by Persian and Phoenician sources back to the narrator’s own narration.

(22) Ταῦτα μὲν νῦν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοινικεῖς λέγουσι. Ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτοις σὺν ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ὡς σύντος ἢ ἄλλος κως ταῦτα ἐγένετο (...) (Hdt. 1.5.3)

These are the tales told by the Persians and the Phenicians severally; and concerning these things I am not going to say that they happened thus or some other way.

The particle νῦν occurs four times with the wish optative in Aristophanes and twice in Aeschylus and Sophocles, but never in Euripides or Plato. In this combination νῦν marks the Discourse Act of the OPTATIVE illocution as the consequence of preceding communicative acts, whether it be by the speaker or the addressee. I suggest that the consequential meaning, which has only been said to be weak with directives, is stronger with the wish optative because the optative is semantically epistemic. In contrast to the combination with the deontic imperative, νῦν in its combination with the wish semantically expresses an evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence of a state of affairs. This epistemic assessment thereby allows for presentation as a consequential Discourse Act.

In example 23 below, the wish is a consequence of the situation sketched out by the Men’s leader himself in the previous Discourse Act, the rhetorical question.

(23) Chorus οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὴν Δήμητρ’ ἐμοῦ ζῶντος ἐγχανοῦνται ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ Κλεομένης, ὃς αὐτὴν κατέσχε πρῶτος, ἀπῆλθεν ἀψάλακτος, ἀλλ’ ὅμως Λακωνικὸν πνέων ἔχετο θῗπλα παραδοὺς ἐμοί, σμικρὸν ἐχον πάνυ τριβώνιον, πεινῶν, ῥυπῶν, ἀπαράτιλτος, ἓξ ἐτῶν ἄλουτος. (Ar. Lys. 272–285)

Men’s leader οὕτως ἐπολιόρκησ’ ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρ’ ἐκεῖνον ἐφ’ ἑπτακαίδεκ’ ἀσπίδων πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις καθεύδων. τασδὶ δὲ τὰς Εὐριπίδῃ θεοῖς τε πάσιν ἐχθρὰς μή νῦν εἰτ’ ἐν <τῇ> τετραπόλει τοῦμ ἐτιν. (Ar. Lys. 272–285)

62 Ar. Ach. 833, Ran. 177, Lys. 285 and V. 755, of which I will only discuss the last two.

63 In S. OT. 644 Creon reacts with “then I wish I never prosper” to Oedipus’ explanation that he wants to hurt Creon. He does this to ask for help from Iocaste as a witness that he has no evil intentions. She aids him in the subsequent utterance. In A. Th. 417 the chorus reacts to Eteocles’ declaration of willingness to fight Tydeus by saying “then may the gods grant good fortune to him who contends on my behalf…”.
Chorus

By Demeter, they’ll not laugh at me while I’m alive!
Not even Cleomenes, the first to occupy this place, left here intact.
No, for all he breathed the Spartan spirit, he left without his weapons-surrendering to me!—with only a little bitty jacket on his back, starving, filthy, unshaven, unwashed for six whole years.

Men’s leader

That’s the way I laid siege to that fellow-savagely! We camped before the gates in ranks seventeen deep. And now shall I stand by and do nothing to put down the effrontery of these women, enemies of all the gods and of Euripides? Then my trophy in the Tetrapolis may as well disappear! (transl. Henderson)

The men’s leader here declares his willingness to ward off the occupying women from the Acropolis in an elaborate rhetorical fashion. By using the rhetorical question (ἐγὼ οὐκ ἄρα σχήσω παρὼν τολμή-ματος τοσούτου;) he adds the presupposition to the Common Ground that he would do nothing to ward off the women. The Discourse Act with νῦν signifies what the consequence of that would be. In other words, he concludes from the presupposition that if he were to do nothing he wishes that his rightfully earned trophy may disappear.

Previous to the wish in this last example, the chorus of old jurors has entertained the possibility that Lovecleon, addicted to being a juror in trials, may finally be convinced to stop being a juror. Stopping will prevent him from furthering the power of the populists, such as Cleon, who effectively manipulated trials for personal gain. However, Lovecleon is gripped by nostalgia for his days in court and the former importance which was given to him by people like Cleon who relied on the success of the trial.

(24) Lovecleon ἰὼ μοί μοι.

Loathecleon ὡς, τί βοᾷς;

Lovecleon μή μοι τούτων μηδὲν υπισχνοῦ.
κείνων ἔραμαι, κεῖθι γενοίμαν,
ἵν’ ὁ κῆρυξ φησι, “τίς ἀψήφιστος; ἀνιστάσθω”.
καπισταίην ἐπὶ τού τήμοις
ψηφιζομένων ὁ τελευταῖος.
σπεῦδ’, ὁ ψυχή. – ποῦ μοι ψυχή; –
pάρες, ὁ σκεράɨ. μὰ τόν Ἡρακλέα
μὴ νῦν ἔτ’ ἐγὼ ’ν τοῖς διστατάις
κλέπτοντα Κλέωνα λάβομι. (Ar. V. 750–759)

Lovecleon What misery!

Loathecleon Here, why are you bellowing?
Lovecleon: Don’t promise me any of your promises! What I yearn for is over there. There is where I want to be, where the herald says, “whoever hasn’t voted please stand!” Yes, I long to stand at the ballot box, the last of the voters! Onward, my soul! Where are you, soul? Let me pass, you shadowy! Great Heracles, if you’re telling the truth, I’d better not be on a jury that convicts Cleon of theft. (transl. Henderson)

The translation by Henderson tries to compensate for the suddenness of Lovecleon’s conclusion, since “if you’re telling the truth” refers to the Common Ground information that Lovecleon will gladly perform jury duty to assist a populist such as Cleon. The compensatory translation thereby adds the basis on which Lovecleon presents his wish as a consequence, which is not explicitly expressed in the clause with the wish optative and νυν.

Conclusions

I hope to have demonstrated that analysing the variation of realizable classical Greek wishes has turned out to be a fruitful enterprise. The variation changed our view on the semantics of the wish optative, which turned out to be non-subjective epistemic due to its contextual communicative value and combinatory characteristics with ἄρα and ἦ. Moreover, examining realizable wishes in their own right enabled us to grasp their own specific illocutionary function, contextualized functions and sincerity condition. Realizable wishes in Classical Greek are used to express the speaker’s psychological commitment to a realizable state of affairs in order to (1) align his/her commitment with those of others, (2) to wish for some type of resolution of current problems and (3) to declare one’s commitment in order to avert evil. Realizable wishes are bound by a sincerity condition, which, when unfulfilled, changes the illocutionary value of the wish to, for example, a figurative damnation of someone/something.

The occasional use of pragmatic particles with realizable wishes were found to be dependent on conditions of Common Ground. The infrequent particles εἴθε and εἰ γάρ are only introduced when the speaker’s psychological commitment has not been established clearly enough in the Common Ground of the addressee(s). The particle νυν presents the wish illocution as a consequential Discourse Act from the previous Discourse Acts in the Common Ground, a value of νυν which has gone unnoticed in previous research.
The approach of this paper has great potential for further research endeavours. The layered approach from FDG can provide welcome insights to other mood uses as well. It has been shown that the combinatorial properties of moods with specific particles are especially informative of moods (see also La Roi 2019), provided that the particles be carefully and critically classified in a hierarchical framework such as FDG. The notion of Common Ground has, with the current paper, for the first time been applied to the domain of modality. In my opinion, the Common Ground is an essential tool for explaining the distribution of moods, as speakers tailor their mood use to the values and beliefs in the Common Ground. Thus, Common Ground knowledge can, for example, explain why speakers use subjective moods or why they combine certain moods with certain particles on particular occasions. One still needs to take into account that speakers have both rhetorical and social reasons for presenting information as a benefit to themselves.

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